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abstract: The study of culturally inherited traits has led to the
suggestion that the evolution of helping behaviors is more likely with
cultural transmission than without. Here we evaluate this idea
through a comparative analysis of selection on helping under both
genetic and cultural inheritance. We develop two simple models for
the evolution of helping through cultural group selection: one in
which selection on the trait depends solely on Darwinian fitness
effects and one in which selection is driven by nonreproductive fac-
tors, specifically imitation of strategies achieving higher payoffs. We
show that when cultural variants affect Darwinian fitness, the selec-
tion pressure on helping can be markedly increased relative to that
under genetic transmission. By contrast, when variants are driven by
nonreproductive factors, the selection pressure on helping may be
reduced relative to that under genetic inheritance. This occurs be-
cause, unlike biological offspring, the spread of cultural variants from
one group to another through imitation does not reduce the number
of these variants in the source group. As a consequence, there is
increased within-group competition associated with traits increasing
group productivity, which reduces the benefits of helping. In these
cases, selection for harming behavior (decreasing the payoff to neigh-
bors) may occur rather than selection for helping.
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Cultural group selection, whereby differential group suc-
cess results from the expression of different cultural traits,
has been proposed as a major force driving the evolution
of “altruistic” helping in humans (Fehr et al. 2002; Henrich
2004; Richerson and Boyd 2005). While genetically in-
herited traits tend to follow strict vertical transmission
from parent to offspring, culturally inherited traits may
be transmitted obliquely from adults outside the nuclear
family to individuals of the offspring generation. Cultural
variants may also be transmitted horizontally between in-
dividuals of the same generation. For instance, birds learn
song dialects from neighboring individuals (Bonner 1980),
chimpanzees imitate group mates that have the skills of
“termiting” with tools (Goodall 1966), and humans gain
knowledge from unrelated individuals living in present and
past generations (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Lums-
den and Wilson 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985). A direct
consequence of these nonvertical transmission schemes is
that they can rapidly homogenize behavior within groups,
and as a result, most individuals in a group may display
the same cultural trait (i.e., high “cultural inbreeding”
sensu Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981 [p. 352] or “cul-
tural relatedness” sensu Allison 1991). For instance, if off-
spring learn a cultural trait by copying a few individuals
in their group (the “teachers” or “leaders”) instead of each
offspring independently copying its parents, the within-
group variance of cultural traits decreases and the between-
group variance increases (see also Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man 1973). Thus, when helper and defector traits are
culturally inherited, helpers will tend to occur together in
a group, and so will defectors or cheaters. The resulting
within-group uniformity reduces the tendency of cheaters
to exploit helpers and concomitantly increases the evo-
lutionary success of helpers. This argument has led to the
view that cultural group selection augments any effects of
genetic transmission in favoring the evolution of “altru-
ism” among humans, especially in groups of large size
where genetic group selection is inefficient (e.g., Fehr et
al. 2002; Henrich 2004; Boyd and Richerson 2005; Rich-
erson and Boyd 2005).
In summarizing a major section of their book, Boyd
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and Richerson (2005, p. 17) say, “In part III we discuss
how conformity reduces within-group cultural variation,
making group-level selection a more plausible process than
group selection on genes is usually thought to be.” But is
it generally true that group-level selection is more plausible
through cultural processes than genetic processes? This
would be a decisive finding because it would suggest that
cultural transmission should be directly associated with an
increased tendency to help others (i.e., culture begets co-
operation). In order to confirm this conjecture, we require
a direct comparison of social evolution under the two
transmission schemes, genetic and cultural. This compar-
ison has been made for panmictic populations by Feldman
et al. (1985), who showed that in fact it may be more
difficult for helping to increase in frequency under cultural
transmission than under genetic assumptions. A prelim-
inary analysis suggested further that the same may be true
for geographically subdivided populations (Lehmann et al.
2007). In this article, we build on these previous studies
and compare genetic and cultural transmission in geo-
graphically subdivided populations by developing simple
models of cultural inheritance of helping traits that are
easily compared with classical models of genetically in-
herited traits. This enables us to assess directly whether
cultural transmission of helping will result in stronger or
weaker selective pressure on helping than occurs under
genetic transmission.
The directional (or systematic) change in frequency of
a cultural variant (as opposed to strict cultural drift for a
neutral or unbiased cultural variant; e.g., Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman 1981) can be affected by a multitude of
factors, many of which do not affect genetic traits. At
the risk of over simplification, we divide these factors into
two non–mutually exclusive categories. First, systematic
change in the frequency of cultural variants can be caused
by their effects on Darwinian fitness, as is the case with
biological traits (effects on reproduction; e.g., Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985).
Most simply, the behavior of having many offspring can
spread and lead to an increase in the frequency of some
religious practices in a population where the practices are
carried out by individuals with many offspring. For ex-
ample, one study found that Australian Roman Catholics
had a 40% higher reproductive fitness than nonreligious
Australians (Kirk et al. 2001, their table 2). If differential
reproduction were the only cause of systematic change in
the frequency of cultural variants, cultural evolution would
mainly be driven by vertical transmission from parent to
offspring, and any unbiased horizontal or oblique trans-
mission (variants are assumed neutral during this stage)
would only alter the distribution of traits within and be-
tween groups as a result of random sampling (i.e., cultural
drift).
The second category of processes that cause directional
change in the frequencies of cultural traits are those that
occur independently of reproductive effects. These pro-
cesses operate through some other form of differential
variant success, such as a cognitive preference or biased
cultural transmission (e.g., conformist or other frequency-
dependent transmission or assimilation functions of cul-
tural variants; see Lumsden and Wilson 1980). Such non-
reproductive differential success can change cultural trait
frequencies through vertical, horizontal, or oblique trans-
mission. For instance, individuals might have a tendency
to imitate/copy cultural traits that are not predictive of
reproductive performance. Such imitation is often as-
sumed to occur by payoff comparison, whereby individuals
copy the strategies of those individuals around them that
are perceived to have higher payoffs (Boyd and Richerson
1985; Rogers 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Kendal
et al. 2006). This could be, for instance, imitating the
successful or the wealthiest, where a social helping trait
might be a timely gift of money to others that are partic-
ularly in need at that moment. Under these situations, a
helping trait may increase in frequency without necessarily
affecting Darwinian fitness.
We develop two simple models for the cultural evolution
of helping behaviors, whereby an individual may increase
the payoff to other individuals in some way. The term
“cooperation” is sometimes used in a broad sense, inter-
changeably with helping (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 2005;
West et al. 2007), and the helping behaviors we study here
are primarily altruistic sensu Hamilton (1964, 1970) with
respect to the currency that drives selection. In the first
model, the directional change in the frequency of helping
is due solely to its effect on reproductive fitness, while in
the second, the changes are caused by nonreproductive
differential success. Our goal is to represent two extreme
cases in a continuum of possible modes of cultural trans-
mission and to compare them with genetic transmission.
We find some confirmation of the view that, relative to
genetically based group selection, cultural group selection
may increase the intensity of selection for helping behav-
iors. When cultural traits affect only reproductive success,
oblique or horizontal cultural transmission can markedly
reduce within-group variation, thereby increasing the se-
lective pressure on helping relative to that under simple
genetic selection. We find a starkly different picture for
the evolution of cultural traits with nonreproductive dif-
ferential success. When transmission is based on a ten-
dency to imitate or learn from individuals with higher
payoffs, an assumption that is often made for social models
(Ellison 1993; Kandori et al. 1993; Hofbauer and Sigmund
1998; Boyd and Richerson 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Hauert
and Doebeli 2004; Kendal et al. 2006), selection for helping
may be markedly reduced relative to that under genetic
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transmission. In fact, harming behavior between members
of a group (as opposed to helping) may be selected for
under this transmission mode.
Model
Life Cycle
Suppose individuals live in a population consisting of an
infinite number of groups, each of finite size N. We con-
sider a single haploid cultural “locus” controlling the ex-
pression of a helping behavior that is inherited culturally.
We assume that two cultural “variants” segregate at this
cultural locus; that is, we consider a dichotomous trait
(e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Rich-
erson 1985). An individual bearing the “helping” variant
(e.g., A) expresses a behavior that results in a payoff cost
C to himself/herself but generates a payoff benefit B that
is shared equally among all group members except the
actor. An individual bearing the “defector” variant (e.g.,
a) takes the payoff benefit but pays no cost. These as-
sumptions greatly simplify the complexities of the ex-
pression of cultural traits, their inheritance, and the eval-
uation of how differential success translates into fitness
costs and benefits. They do, however, provide a useful
approximation that allows us to disentangle the effects of
diverse demographic regimes and cultural transmission
rules on the evolution of the trait. It also appears that the
conclusions from such simple discrete models retain qual-
itative relevance in more sophisticated cultural scenarios,
for example, continuous traits and nondiscrete mental rep-
resentations of traits (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981;
Henrich and Boyd 2002). We also assume that individuals,
regardless of the cultural variants they carry, have a high
fecundity. This assumption is obviously violated in many
human societies; it is adopted here to avoid the intricacies
of demographic stochasticity (fluctuation of group size),
which would make qualitative comparisons between the
models much more difficult.
The events of our idealized life cycle occur in the fol-
lowing order. (1) Reproduction occurs, with each adult
individual producing a large number of juveniles accord-
ing to its phenotype and the phenotypes of its groupmates.
Juveniles inherit/assimilate the cultural variant of their
parent (i.e., vertical transmission of cultural variants). (2)
Juveniles disperse independently of each other with prob-
ability m to another group. (3) Density-dependent regu-
lation occurs, and exactly N juveniles reach adulthood in
each group. (4) Horizontal transmission of cultural vari-
ants occurs among the adult individuals in the population.
One can imagine many different horizontal transmis-
sion modes occurring during the last stage of the life cycle.
Here, we will consider only two special cases, both of which
have been studied previously. (i) The cultural variants af-
fect only the reproductive fitness of the actor and recip-
ients. In this case, horizontal transmission can occur (one
individual might copy/imitate another), but the tendency
to copy is not affected by whether the “template” or “ex-
emplar” individual is a helper or a defector (C and/or B
do not affect cultural transmission); hence, the cultural
variants are neutral during horizontal transmission (i.e.,
there is no systematic change of variant frequency at the
population level). (ii) The phenotypic effects of cultural
variants (C and B) affect their probability of horizontal
transmission but have no effects on reproduction. For this
case, we analyze two different payoff-based imitation rules
during horizontal transmission, whereby individuals tend
to adopt cultural variants by comparing the payoffs of
different classes of individuals: a “group payoff compar-
ison” rule, where individuals compare their payoffs with
the average payoff in a group, and a “pairwise payoffs
comparison” rule, where individuals compare their payoff
with the payoff of a randomly encountered individual.
These two updating schemes will be described in detail
during the mathematical analysis.
To aid in the interpretation of our results, we first recall
that in the absence of horizontal transmission and with
only vertical transmission (which is equivalent here to hap-
loid genetic inheritance), the condition for the invasion
of the helping variant A under the life cycle described
above is given under weak selection by
!C 1 0. (1)
Helping is selected for only if the actor’s fecundity—that
is, the number of its juveniles counted before the density-
dependent regulation stage—is increased (Taylor 1992a,
1992b). Taylor’s rule is independent of the spatial!C 1 0
structure of the population (see also Wilson et al. 1992).
It can be used as a yardstick with which the effect of
changing assumptions on the evolution of helping behav-
iors in populations subject to limited dispersal can be com-
pared. For instance, costly helping can evolve when it re-
sults in group size expansion by reducing group extinction
rates (i.e.,“selective extinction”; e.g., Eshel 1972; Aoki
1982; Bowles 2006) or by increasing individual produc-
tivity through the effect of the helping behavior on various
demographical variables (e.g., van Baalen and Rand 1998;
Le Galliard et al. 2003; Lehmann et al. 2006). Selection on
helping is also increased by changing assumptions about
individual life history (such as introducing overlapping
generations, non-Poisson progeny distribution, sex-biased
dispersal), the mode of dispersal, the mode of competition
between groups, and the mode of group fission (e.g., Rog-
ers 1990; Taylor and Irwin 2000; Irwin and Taylor 2001;
Gardner and West 2006; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Grafen 2007;
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Lehmann and Balloux 2007; van Veelen and Hopfensitz
2007). Recognition of kin or punishment of defectors
within groups (e.g., Boyd et al. 2003; Axelrod et al. 2004;
Jansen and van Baalen 2006; Rousset and Roze 2007) and
niche construction effects (e.g., Lehmann 2006; Wakano
2007) also favor the evolution of costly helping. Here, we
ask whether the two different modes of horizontal trans-
mission introduced above will result in more relaxed or
more stringent conditions for the evolution of helping than
predicted by the rule.!C 1 0
Price Equation
The average frequency p of variant A in the population
after one iteration of the life cycle is given by
′ ∗p p E[w p ], (2)ij ij
where the prime denotes the value in the next generation,
the expectation operator refers to an average over allE[7]
groups in the population and all individuals within groups
( ), is the fitness function giving the expectedpp E[p ] wij ij
number of successful offspring of individual i of group j,
and is the frequency (0 or 1) of variant A in that in-∗pij
dividual before reproduction but after horizontal cultural
transmission. Here, , where is the fre-∗p p p " Dp pij ij ij ij
quency (0 or 1) of variant A in individual ij before cultural
transmission and is the change in the number of A’sDpij
(0, 1, or !1) in individual i of group j as a result of
horizontal cultural transmission. Substituting into∗pij
equation (2), we obtain . Noting′p p E[w p ]" E[w Dp ]ij ij ij ij
that because horizontal trans-E[w Dp ]p E[w ]E[Dp ]ij ij ij ij
mission occurs before reproduction, so that is inde-Dpij
pendent of the fitness of individual ij, and that the ex-
pectation of the fitness function over all individuals is
equal to 1 because population size is constant (E[w ]pij
), we obtain the change in frequency of variant A:1
Dpp Cov (w , p )" E[Dp ], (3)ij ij ij
which is a special case of the Price equation (Price 1970).
This equation emphasizes that the per generation change
in the frequency of A depends on two terms: first, on the
covariance between the fitness of an individ-Cov (w , p )ij ij
ual and the frequency of A in that individual, and second,
on the expected change in variant A frequency asE[Dp ]ij
a result of horizontal cultural transmission (several rounds
of horizontal cultural transmission could actually occur
within a generation).
Under alternative (i) of our life cycle, there is no sys-
tematic change of variant frequency through horizontal
transmission ( ), and the change in variant AE[Dp ]p 0ij
frequency is entirely accounted for by the covariance be-
tween fitness and variant frequency before cultural trans-
mission, namely
Dpp Cov (w , p ). (4)ij ij
By contrast, under alternative (ii) of our life cycle, variant
A does not affect fitness ( ), and its sys-Cov (w , p )p 0ij ij
tematic change in frequency is entirely accounted for by
cultural transmission ( ). Let∗Dpp E[Dp ]p E[p ! p ]ij ij ij
, where denotes the transmission function giv-∗p p t p tij ij ij ij
ing the expected number of individuals that have inherited
the cultural variant from individual i in group j; noting
that because population size is constant, we canE[t ]p 1ij
write
Dpp Cov (t , p ). (5)ij ij
In order to evaluate the fitness function and thewij
transmission function , we need a payoff function fortij
the individuals in the population. The payoff to individual
i in group j (relative to the payoff to an individual that
neither gave nor received helping) will be written as
B
1" f p 1! Cp " p . (6)!ij ij kjN! 1 k(i
That is, individual ij pays a cost C if he/she carries variant
A and receives a fraction of the benefit B gen-1/(N! 1)
erated by each individual (excluding himself) that helps
in group j. For the “Darwinian” model, is simply1" fij
the fecundity of individual ij, while for the “imitation”
model, it represents a preference that is ascribed to that
individual. We will also use the payoff functions ,1" fj
namely the average of in group j (see eq. [A10] in1" fij
the appendix in the online edition of the American Nat-
uralist). Finally, we will need a payoff function that av-
erages over all groups excluding group j from the1" fj
average. Because of our assumption that there is an infinite
number of groups in the population, an average over all
groups, excluding a single focal group, converges to the
average payoff over all groups in the population (see1" f
eq. [A11]). For notational simplicity, we will thus use
for any average over all groups excluding a single1" f
focal group.
Helping Affects Reproduction
Following previous work (e.g., Frank 1998; Rousset 2004),
we now derive the direct fitness function of individualwij
ij. This depends on both the expected number of its off-
spring reaching adulthood in group j and on those reach-
ing adulthood in other groups after dispersing. A number
of the offspring of individual i from group(1!m)(1" f )ij
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j remain in group j and compete against an average num-
ber of offspring produced in that group(1!m)(1" f )j
and an average number of immigrant offspringm(1" f )
produced in the other groups. A number of them(1" f )ij
offspring of individual ij disperse and compete against an
average number of offspring. Collecting all terms,1" f
the fitness of individual ij is
(1!m)(1" f ) m(1" f )ij ijw p " . (7)ij (1!m)(1" f )"m(1" f ) 1" fj
In order to simplify our analysis, we now assume that
the phenotypic effects C and B on fecundity are of small
order d. This “weak selection” assumption (e.g., Hamilton
1964; Bu¨rger 2000; Kirkpatrick et al. 2002; Roze and Rous-
set 2003) implies that , , and fwill be of order d. Recallingf fij j
that for small x we have , we approx-y/(1" x) " y(1! x)
imate (by neglecting second- and higher-order terms) the
increments and/or decrements in fitness of individual ij
resulting from the expression of the cultural variant A by
all individuals in the population carrying it as
2w " 1" (f ! f )! (1!m) (f ! f ). (8)ij ij j
Helping Affects Cultural Preferences
We now derive the direct transmission function of in-tij
dividual i in group j, which depends on the expected num-
ber of individuals that adopt its cultural variant through
imitation. We express the transmission function as
t p Pr (kl R ij), (9)!ij
l,k
where is the probability that individual k fromPr (kl R ij)
group l adopts (copies) the cultural variant of individual
i from group j, and the sum runs over all groups in the
population and all individuals within groups. Hence, tij
represents the total probability that the cultural variant
carried by individual ij is copied.
As mentioned in “Life Cycle,” we will investigate the
effects of two different payoff-based imitation rules on the
probabilities of horizontal transmission. Under the “group
payoff comparison” rule, with probability , a focal1!mct
individual compares the payoff of a randomly chosen
member of his/her group (including himself) with that of
the average payoff in his/her group and adopts the variant
of the chosen member with probability given by the payoff
to that individual relative to the average payoff in the focal
individual’s group. From these assumptions, the proba-
bility that any individual k from group j adoptsPr (kj R ij)
the cultural variant of individual i from group j is given
by
(1!m )(1" f )ct ijPr (kj R ij)p , (10)
N(1" f )j
because with probability , individual ij is cho-(1!m )/Nct
sen for payoff comparison by individual kj, in which case
the cultural variant of ij is copied with probability (1"
. With complementary probability , a focalf )/(1" f ) mij j ct
individual compares the payoff of a randomly chosen in-
dividual from another group (nonfocal group) with that
of the average payoff over all different groups and adopts
the variant of the chosen individual with a probability
given by the relative payoff to that individual. Therefore,
the probability that individual k from group h (where
) adopts the cultural variant of individual i fromh( j
group j is
m (1" f )ct ijPr (kh R ij)p , (11)
(n ! 1)N(1" f )d
where is the probability that individual ij ism /(n ! 1)Nct d
chosen for payoff comparison by individual kh ( )h( j
and where is the (very large) number of groups in thend
population (i.e., ). Substitution of equations (10)n r #d
and (11) into equation (9) gives
(1!m )(1" f ) m (1" f )ct ij ct ijt p " . (12)ij 1" f 1" fj
Under complete migration ( ) and with completemp 1
cultural mixing ( ), the fitness function (eq. [7])m p 1ct
and the transmission function (eq. [12]) become identical:
. That these two models be-w p t p (1" f )/(1" f )ij ij ij
come similar in a panmictic population is a standard result
of population genetics (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Ken-
dal et al. 2006). However, as soon as the population is
structured (i.e., and ), the two models di-m ! 1 m ! 1ct
verge. Intuition as to the difference between them derives
from the assumption that , , and f are of small order d,f fij j
and following the same argument that led to equation (8),
we have from equation (12) the weak selection approxi-
mation
t " 1" (f ! f )! (1!m )(f ! f ). (13)ij ij ct j
Comparing equation (8) with equation (13) reveals that
the competition term (second terms in eqq. [8] and [13])
is larger under cultural transmission (weighted by 1!
) than under genetic transmission (weighted bym (1!ct
), provided the mixing rates ( and m) are the same.2m) mct
This occurs because, unlike biological offspring, cultural
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variants can spread to another group through imitation
without reducing the number of copies of these variants
in the source group. Hence, all else being equal, an increase
in average group productivity, due to the expression of
helping, increases local competition more under the cul-
tural imitation model than under genetic transmission.
This is also true when imitation occurs by pairwise payoff
comparison, but since this situation is more complicated,
we have included it in the appendix (see eqq. [A2]–[A8]).
Finally, we mention that the assumption that andf ! fij j
are of order d does not imply that individuals havef ! fij
a very sensitive method of comparing payoffs. The dif-
ference between payoffs used to assess the highest payoff
will depend on the difference between the cost C and the
benefit B, which can be very different from each other,
even when both are assumed to be small.
Results
Helping Affects Reproduction
We analyze the gradient of selection on the helping variant
A when it affects the Darwinian fitness w. Substituting
equation (8) into equation (4), using the payoff function
(eq. [6]), and rearranging (see eqq. [A9]–[A15]), we find
that the change in frequency of variant A is given to the
first order of selection by
2 RDpp p(1! p)[!C" BR! (1!m) (B! C)R ], (14)
where R is the regression of the cultural variant at the
helping locus of a randomly chosen group mate on the
cultural variant in a focal individual (i.e., cultural relat-
edness; Allison 1991) and
1 N! 1RR p " R (15)( )N N
is the cultural relatedness between a focal individual and
an individual sampled with replacement from its group
(i.e., including the focal individual with probability ).1/N
The coefficient of cultural relatedness R predicts the
tendency of a focal individual’s group mate to express the
cultural helping variant given that he/she carries that var-
iant, and it corresponds here to the probability of identity
in state between two homologous cultural variants sam-
pled from two different individuals from the same group
(see eqq. [A16], [A17]). This cultural relatedness will gen-
erally depend on selection, but because of the assumptions
of weak selection and unbiased horizontal transmission,
it is sufficient to evaluate it in a neutral model only
( ; Roze and Rousset 2003; Rousset 2004). This entailsdp 0
that R will be frequency-independent but will depend on
the life cycle parameters of the model, such as group size
N, the migration ratem, and features of horizontal cultural
transmission (see below). The term in equationp(1! p)
(14) represents the variance in the frequency of A in the
population, which does not affect the direction of selec-
tion, while the term in square brackets is the gradient of
selection. Equation (14) informs us that the change in
frequency p of variant A will depend on the balance of
three terms: the direct cost C of the helping by a focal
individual, the benefit BR received by a focal individual
from all other helping individuals in his/her group, and
the increase in competition faced by the focal individual’s
offspring due to the help expressed by him/her and other
group members that augments group productivity. The
selection pressure analogous to equation (14) was first
obtained by Taylor (1992a) for genetically determined
helping traits and can also be obtained as a special case
of the selection pressure on culturally determined strong
reciprocity in spatially subdivided populations (Lehmann
et al. 2007, their eq. [A-17]).
The selection gradient on variant A depends on how
actors affect their own fitness and the fitness of group
neighbors (i.e., social effects). In order to identify the net
effect on its fitness of the behavior of a single focal!c
individual expressing variant A, we set the cultural relat-
edness to 0 ( ) in the gradient of selection of equationRp 0
(14), which removes all correlated social effects (Rousset
2004, chap. 7), giving
2(1!m) (B! C)
!cp !C! . (16)
N
Here, is the direct fecundity cost to a focal individual!C
expressing an act of helping, represents the in-(B! C)/N
crement in the average productivity of group members
following the act of helping by the focal individual, and
is the probability that an offspring of the focal2(1!m)
individual competes against another offspring produced
in the focal group. Hence, by helping neighbors, the focal
individual increments group productivity, which is dele-
terious for himself/herself because it decreases the likeli-
hood that its own offspring will succeed. Following Ham-
ilton (1964, 1970), an act of helping will subsequently be
called “altruistic” whenever expressing variant A decreases
the fitness of the actor while increasing the fitness of re-
ceptors when everything else is held constant. Thus, the cost
of altruism is the difference in fitness between not expressing
and expressing variant A while holding everything else con-
stant, which gives c in equation (16) for all variant fre-
quencies under our assumption of weak selection.
In the special case where the direction of selection on
variant A is entirely accounted for by the net effect of an
actor on its fitness, which occurs in the case of an isolated
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panmictic population of size N (i.e., andmp 0 Rp 0
in eqq. [14], [16]), it would be beneficial for the actor to
harm neighbors ( ). This occurs because the resultingB ! 0
decrement of competition would increase the chance that
the offspring of an actor who harms neighbors succeed,
with the direction of selection on such a harming variant
being positive (i.e., ) if (Hamilton!c 1 0 C/B ! !1/(N! 1)
1971). But because the population is structured, the di-
rection of selection on variant A is not determined solely
by fitness effects on self but depends on the correlated
behaviors of group members. With positive relatedness
between group members ( ), more individuals areR 1 0
helping each other in groups, which, on the one hand,
increases the intensity of competition and, on the other
hand, leads to high indirect benefits. How do these op-
posite factors balance each other? From equation (14), the
selection pressure on the helping variant A is positive at
all variant frequencies ( ) if the cost to benefit ratioDp 1 0
satisfies
2C [1"m(2!m)(N! 1)]R! (1!m)
! . (17)2B N! (1!m) [1" (N! 1)R]
When the right-hand side of equation (17) is 0, the
direction of selection on the helping variant is given by
Taylor’s rule (eq. [1]), and neither costly helping!C 1 0
nor harming evolves. This occurs when the steady state
cultural relatedness is given by the threshold value
2(1!m)∗R p , (18)
1"m(2!m)(N! 1)
which is obtained by setting the right-hand side of equa-
tion (17) to 0 and solving for R. This value of relatedness
corresponds to the relatedness obtained for genetic traits
(i.e., Wright’s measure of population structure; Wright
1931, 1951) under a Wright-Fisher mode of reproduction
(i.e., all adults reproduce and die per unit time; Ewens
2004). At this value of R, the positive effect of relatedness
on helping is exactly cancelled by the concomitant increase
in competition; thus, the direction of selection on the trait
is independent of the structure of the population (Taylor
1992a, 1992b). If the cultural relatedness is higher than
the threshold value ( ), the right-hand side of equa-∗R 1 R
tion (17) is positive, and helping neighbors (i.e., ) atB 1 0
a fecundity cost to self ( ) may be selected for. But ifC 1 0
, the cultural relatedness is lower than the threshold∗R ! R
value, and the right-hand side of equation (17) will be
negative. In that case, harming neighbors (i.e., ) atB ! 0
a fecundity cost to self ( ) can be selected for.C 1 0
For our model of unbiased horizontal cultural inheri-
tance, the steady state value of the cultural relatedness is
obtained from the recursion presented in the appendix
(see eqq. [A19], [A20]) as
2Na " (1!m) (a ! a )d s dRp , (19)2N! (1!m) (N! 1)(a ! a )s d
where denotes the probability that two different indi-a s
viduals from a group who carried identical cultural vari-
ants before horizontal transmission also have identical var-
iants after horizontal transmission, and denotes thead
probability that two individuals carrying different variants
before horizontal transmission have identical cultural var-
iants after cultural transmission. From this equation, it is
easy to find a horizontal transmission scheme that will
result in a cultural relatedness such that even in!R 1 R
very large groups ( ), in which caseN r # Rp a /[1!d
. Suppose that during horizontal trans-2(1!m) (a ! a )]s d
mission, each individual within a group adopts the cultural
variant of a randomly chosen leader or teacher from its
group with probability t (“one to many” transmission;
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, chap. 3.11), while with
complementary probability , an individual adopts the1! t
cultural variant from another individual sampled at ran-
dom from its group. Then, we have , and2a p a p td s
R is simply given by . Taking the limit and2t N r #
in equation (17), we find2Rp t
2C (2!m)mt
! , (20)2 2B 1! (1!m) t
which illustrates that if t is sufficiently large, altruistic
helping can invade the population under “one to many
transmission” in groups of any size even if migration is
strong.
Helping Affects Cultural Preferences
We now analyze the gradient of selection on variant A
when it affects the transmission function t. Substituting
equation (13) into equation (5), using the payoff function
(eq. [6]), assuming no genetic migration between groups
( ), and rearranging (see eqq. [A18], [A19]), we findmp 1
that the change in frequency of variant A is given to the
first order of selection by
RDpp p(1! p)[!C" BR! (1!m )(B! C)R ], (21)ct
which can also be obtained from Lehmann et al.’s (2007)
equation [A-38] as a special case of the selection pressure
on culturally determined strong reciprocity. The only dif-
ference between this equation and equation (14) is that
the competition term is increased, as it is now weighted
by the factor instead of . Consequently,21!m (1!m)ct
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the net effect of an individual bearing cultural variant!c
A on its ability to transmit that variant to the next gen-
eration (obtained by setting in eq. [21]) is givenRp 0
by
(1!m )(B! C)ct!cp !C! . (22)
N
Comparing this equation with equation (16), we see that
the consequence of helping neighbors is more deleterious
for an actor when cultural variants affect the nonrepro-
ductive transmission function t than when they affect the
fitness function w. This suggests that the threshold value
of cultural relatedness above which helping instead of∗R
harming is selected for will be greater in the former case
than in the latter. By following the same argument as for
variants that are linked to physical reproduction, helping
will subsequently be called “altruistic” whenever express-
ing variant A produces .!c ! 0
From the selection gradient (eq. [21]), we find that the
helping variant A is selected for at all variant frequencies
if
C [1"m (N! 1)]R! (1!m )ct ct
! . (23)
B N! (1!m )[1" (N! 1)R]ct
Costly helping can now be selected for when the cultural
relatedness exceeds the threshold value
1!mct∗R p , (24)
1"m (N! 1)ct
which is greater than that given by equation (18) for the
same migration rates ( ). When the cultural re-m p mct
latedness takes this value, the direction of selection on the
cultural variant is independent of population structure and
is given by Taylor’s rule. This corresponds to a!C 1 0
Moran process of imitation, that is, when one individual
in the population updates its strategy per unit time (Ewens
2004).
But what about the value of the cultural relatedness fol-
lowing our life cycle assumptions, where all individuals in
the populations simultaneously update their strategy (i.e.,
Wright-Fisher process; Ewens 2004)? The cultural related-
ness between two individuals under our imitation model is
obtained as a solution to 2Rp (1!m ) {1/N" [(N!ct
because with probability , two different21)/N]R} (1!m )ct
individuals randomly sampled from a focal group both im-
itate the cultural variant of a focal group member, in which
case they both imitate the same individual with probability
. Consequently, the cultural relatedness is given at steady1/N
state (see eq. [18]) by
2(1!m )ctRp . (25)
1"m (2!m )(N! 1)ct ct
Substituting equation (25) into equation (23), we find
that the helping variant can invade the population when
the cost to benefit ratio satisfies
C !(1!m )ct
! . (26)
B N(2!m )! (1!m )ct ct
Since the right-hand side is always negative, only harming
group mates (i.e., ) can be selected for if there is aB ! 0
payoff cost ( ) to expressing variant A. Hence, if in-C 1 0
dividuals tend to copy the cultural variant of group mem-
bers under the present imitation scheme, selection tends
to promote the evolution of traits decreasing the payoff
to group members. Note that we do not label such a trait
“spiteful” because harming is self-serving here (Foster et
al. 2001). The cultural variant spreads only when its ex-
pression increases the number of copies of the actor’s ex-
emplar (i.e., with given by eq. [22]).!c 1 0 !c
Discussion
Cultural transmission occurs throughout the animal king-
dom (Bonner 1980; Avital and Jablonka 2000) and is central
to human sociality (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981;
Lumsden andWilson 1981; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Like
genetic evolution, cultural evolution can be strongly affected
by population subdivision, that is, cultural group selection,
where differential group success results from the expression
of different cultural traits (Fehr et al. 2002; Henrich 2004;
Richerson and Boyd 2005). As with genetic evolution, se-
lection on variants (predictors of phenotype) under cultural
evolution (be they social or nonsocial) can be described in
terms of direct and indirect selection coefficients weighted
by statistical associations (e.g., linkage disequilibrium, re-
latedness coefficient) between variants, sampled at the same
and/or different loci, from the same and/or from different
individuals (e.g., Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 1984; Feldman
et al. 1985; Frank 1998; Roze and Rousset 2005; Gardner
et al. 2007). But a key feature of cultural transmission rel-
ative to genetic transmission is the ease with which traits
can be passed on to biologically unrelated individuals
through oblique or horizontal transmission schemes, a pro-
cess that can lead to high cultural relatedness within groups
(“cultural inbreeding” [Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981]
or “cultural relatedness” [Allison 1991]). In this article, we
have investigated how, through its effect on the dynamics
of cultural relatedness, population subdivision influences
the evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping be-
haviors under different cultural transmission schemes. Our
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analyses have revealed that cultural transmission can pro-
mote as well as inhibit the evolution of altruism relative to
simple genetic transmission, thus leading to a variety of
outcomes that depend on the way cultural transmission
occurs.
When the expression of cultural variants directly affects
the reproductive success of individuals, and when oblique
and horizontal transmission are unbiased, selection on cul-
turally determined helping traits operates qualitatively like
selection on genetically determined helping (eq. [14]). The
only difference occurs through effects on degree of cultural
relatedness R in groups of interacting individuals. As in
simple genetic models, this coefficient represents the prob-
ability that two individuals in a group display the same
behavior; when it is high, altruistic helping can be favored
because helping is directed toward other individuals bear-
ing similar traits. We saw that cultural relatedness can be
much greater than genetic relatedness (eq. [19]), especially
when there is a “one to many” transmission rule in the
population, where individuals tend to copy only a few
individuals within groups who could be the “teachers” of
the “leaders” of the group (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
1981). And this process is plausible: there is evidence that
new innovations spread because a few “opinion leaders”
take them up and are subsequently imitated by the rest of
the group/village (Rogers 1995). It is also possible that
“one to many” transmission schemes occur in nonhuman
species, such as chimpanzees, where social learning is com-
mon and traditions—such as tool use, sexual behavior,
and social organization—have been documented (Avital
and Jablonka 2000). The prediction of cultural group se-
lection (Fehr et al. 2002; Henrich 2004; Richerson and
Boyd 2005), namely that cultural transmission can ho-
mogenize behaviors within groups and promote the evo-
lution of altruistic helping in groups of very large size, is
thus supported. But there is still the question of how non-
vertical social learning rules can evolve in the first place.
A recent model of the coevolution of helping and cultural
transmission found that the benefits of helping are not
sufficient to coselect for nonvertical transmission in groups
of large size (Lehmann and Feldman, forthcoming), so
that for social learning to evolve, other factors, which could
be by-products of the evolution of individual learning in
temporally varying environments, must be operating
(Boyd and Richerson 1985; Wakano et al. 2004; Borenstein
et al. 2008).
Our models that allow culturally determined helping to
be transmitted by imitation/social learning with no effect
of the strategy on reproduction offer a very different per-
spective from those in which helping affects reproduction.
We considered a situation where individuals copy others
from their group or from other groups and tend to copy
individuals that perform well according to some arbitrary
payoff or cultural criteria (so-called proportional updat-
ing). These payoffs could involve social standing or wealth
for competing individuals and market share or the price
of a good for competing firms. But in this case of non-
reproductive differential success of cultural variants, cul-
tural transmission may actually inhibit the evolution of
helping behaviors. This occurs because, by incrementing
the payoff to neighbors, an actor markedly decreases the
likelihood of being imitated by other members of its group.
The local increase in competition actually turns out to be
stronger in the case where cultural variants affect nonre-
productive differential success (cf. eqq. [7], [12]), which
can be understood by recognizing the different role of
“migration” under these two situations (fig. 1). When traits
are linked to physical reproduction, migration of juveniles
markedly reduces the intensity of local competition to
which the offspring of a focal individual are exposed (see
the denominator of the first term in eq. [7]; fig. 1c, re-
productive column). By contrast, when “migration” occurs
through an individual copying amember of another group,
the transmission of a cultural trait to another group does
not by itself reduce the amount of competition in the
source group (see the denominator of the first term in eq.
[12]), which results in a situation where a focal individual
is exposed to increased competition stemming from his
helping neighbors (fig. 1c, nonreproductive column). This
difference turns out to be crucial under our life cycle as-
sumptions because it may not only cancel out the payoff
benefit of helping, as occurs in the classical models of
Taylor (1992a, 1992b), but may go further and even select
for the evolution of unconditional harming behavior to-
ward group mates (eq. [26]). To our knowledge, this
represents the first such example in a large subdivided
population (formally infinite population size). Cultural
transmission, therefore, may inhibit the evolution of al-
truistic helping.
Our imitation model also allowed us to identify life-
history conditions under which the direction of selection
on the cultural variant becomes independent of population
structure, that is, when the direction of selection is given
by the rule. This occurs under a Moran process!C 1 0
of imitation with one individual in the population up-
dating its strategy per unit time (see eq. [24]), whereas for
genetic inheritance or when cultural variants affect repro-
duction, this condition is obtained when reproduction fol-
lows the Wright-Fisher process (see eq. [18]), where all
individuals in the population simultaneously reproduce
(see eq. [1]; Taylor 1992a, 1992b; Rousset 2004). It is well
established that when helping affects Darwinian fitness and
everything else remains equal, helping is more likely to be
favored under “asynchronous” than “synchronous” up-
dating (e.g., Taylor and Irwin 2000; Irwin and Taylor 2001;
Hauert and Doebeli 2004). In line with these findings, our
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Figure 1: How cultural transmission can inhibit the evolution of helping behaviors, in cartoon form. Reproductive: the left column depicts a
genetically inherited trait, or, equivalently, a cultural trait that propagates purely via reproductive effects. Nonreproductive: the right column depicts
a cultural trait that propagates purely via nonreproductive effects; for example, helping means giving money, and individuals tend to copy the
behavior of the wealthiest (the individual with the largest light bulb). a, No helping behaviors (neutral trait here). b, White helps gray (large white
arrow) in groups where there is no migration. This increases gray’s fitness or wealth but means that white experiences more local competition
because of gray’s success (small white arrow). For the reproductive case, this corresponds to altruistic helping. For the nonreproductive case, this is
also altruism but with respect to the evolutionary currency (e.g., wealth) but not altruism in a reproductive sense. c, White helps gray in a group
where there is “migration” of cultural variants between groups. When the variants are linked to physical reproduction, the migration ratem between
groups means that only a proportion ( ) of white’s offspring remain in the focal group, which in turn face competition from only of1!m 1!m
gray’s offspring that remained philopatric (eq. [7]). These two terms combine, with the result that the net competitive influence of gray on white
is approximatively of order (eq. [8]). By contrast, when the variants are not linked to physical reproduction, the spread of ideas between2(1!m)
groups at rate does not involve offspring physically leaving the group. Hence, conditional on white copying an individual locally (with probabilitymct
), the competitive effect of gray on white resulting from white helping gray is not reduced (eq. [12]). This implies that the net competitive1!mct
influence of gray on white is of order , not (eq. [13]). This may result in the evolution of self-serving harming behaviors rather21!m (1!m )ct ct
than altruistic helping.
results suggest that under an imitation model, harming is
more likely to be favored under “synchronous” than “asyn-
chronous” updating. Will cultural processes that act in-
dependently of reproduction always impede the spread of
helping? Probably not; if we assume that imitation always
occurs on the basis of payoffs relative to the average payoff
of the population, then helping would have no effect on
local competition and would evolve more easily. This sce-
nario is in fact analogous to the process of “selective em-
igration” proposed by Rogers (1990) for genetically in-
herited helping, a process implying that competition
occurs only among emigrants globally and that groups
with more helpers produce more emigrants. Since there is
no effect of helping on local competition under this sce-
nario, helping can invade the population when the cost
to benefit ratio satisfies , whether variant A affectsC/B ! R
Darwinian fitness or nonreproductive payoffs. Neverthe-
less, there is empirical evidence that individuals may prefer
local information over global information when copying
others (Rogers 1995). While it remains unclear whether
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cultural evolution occurs without reproductive effects in
nonhuman species, evidence of social comparison abounds
in the human lineage (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Fliess-
bach et al. 2007) and is frequently used in assumptions
used to construct models of economic agents (e.g., Ellison
1993; Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993).
Previous models of cultural transmission of social traits
resulting in nonreproductive differential success have some-
times assumed that imitation occurs by “pairwise payoff
comparison” rules (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Boyd et al.
2003). In our results, such pairwise imitation schemes result
in qualitatively similar dynamics to our “group payoff com-
parison” rule (cf. eqq. [13], [A8]), namely harming rather
than helping behaviors are favored. This result seems to be
at variance with the view that group-beneficial norms can
spread rapidly as a result of cultural group selection when
transmission follows these imitation schemes (Boyd and
Richerson 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich 2004). There are
two main reasons for the difference between these results.
The first is that Boyd and Richerson (2002) assume that
groups are of infinite size ( ), which removes any self-N r #
serving benefits from harming neighbors (i.e., the second
term in eq. [22] vanishes). In that situation, selection favors
helping only when . Another difference, however, is!C 1 0
that the social normmodeled by Boyd and Richerson (2002)
is costly only as long as the frequency of the norm in groups
is below a threshold frequency ; otherwise, expressing the∗p
social norm is beneficial for the actor. They assume that
there is a selfish benefit of adopting the norm once many
individuals express it. Such a social norm cannot invade
when rare in groups of infinite size, and Boyd and Richerson
(2002) assume that this social threshold frequency is reached
by initially fixing the social norm in at least one group in
the population, although this requires additional mecha-
nisms, since cultural drift cannot produce fixation of the
norm in groups of infinite size.
In the appendix, we derive Boyd and Richerson’s model
for finite group size by following exactly their assumptions
concerning the costs and benefits resulting from the ex-
pression of the social norm (see eqq. [A21]–[A34]). In
this case, the social norm to help others can be favored
even when rare because, as a result of the buildup of
cultural relatedness in groups of finite size by cultural drift,
an actor is likely to interact with other individuals bearing
the same social norm. Thus, finite group size allows the
social threshold frequency to be crossed naturally. The!p
condition under which selection favors the norm will ul-
timately depend on group size and the cultural mixing
rate; in our model, this condition is met for large group
size and in the absence of a public good benefit when
(see eq. [A34]). But∗p ! 1/[Nm (2!m )! (1!m )]ct ct ct
had we assumed genetic inheritance, the selective pressure
on the norm would have increased because, everything
else being equal, the increase in competition resulting from
the expression of a social trait is higher in the model of
Boyd and Richerson (2002) than under genetic transmis-
sion (cf. eqq. [8], [13]). This illustrates that our model is
fully consistent with the results found by Boyd and Rich-
erson (2002), but the different conclusions stem from
modeling different social traits. We considered that helping
is altruistic at all variant frequency, while Boyd and Rich-
erson (2002) considered that helping is altruistic only be-
low a threshold frequency, otherwise the social norm is
self-serving.
We close then with what in hindsight may seem to be
an obvious point. Just because we humans have cultural
transmission, it should not be assumed that this leads to
a more cooperative or altruistic state than exists in those
species that lack it. Indeed, our models suggest that it will
be those cultural transmission schemes that become the
most detached from biological reproduction (“pure cul-
tural transmission”; Lumsden and Wilson 1980; Lumsden
and Wilson 1981) that are the most likely to result in
selection for harming behavior.
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Appendix from L. Lehmann et al., “Cultural Transmission Can Inhibit
the Evolution of Altruistic Helping”
(Am. Nat., vol. 172, no. 1, p. 12)
Evaluation of the Selection Gradients
Pairwise Payoff Comparison Rule
We derive here the transmission function for the model where imitation occurs with a “pairwise payofftij
comparison” rule. Under this transmission rule, with probability , a focal individual compares his/her1! mct
payoff with that of a randomly chosen individual from his/her group (excluding himself/herself) and adopts the
variant of the group mate with a probability given by the payoff to that individual relative to the sum of the
focal individual’s and the group mate’s payoffs. With complementary probability , the focal individualmct
compares his/her payoff with that of an individual chosen at random from another group (nonfocal group) and
adopts the variant of that individual with a probability given by the payoff to that individual relative to the sum
of the focal individual’s and the chosen individual’s payoffs. This updating rule is equivalent to the one
considered by Boyd and Richerson (2002), Boyd et al. (2003), and Lehmann et al. (2007), although Boyd and
Richerson (2002) considered a more general population structure where there is isolation by distance, but they
assumed infinite group size. Here we consider the effect of finite group size but without isolation by distance.
From the assumptions just described, the probability that individual i from group j retains its cultural variant is
(1! m )(1" f ) m (1" f )ct ij ct ijPr (ij R ij)p " , (A1)! !!(N! 1)[(1" f )" (1" f )] (n ! 1)N[(1" f )" (1" f )]k(i l(j kij kj d ij kl
while the probability that individual k ( ) from group j adopts the cultural variant of individual i from groupk( i
j is
(1! m )(1" f )ct ijPr (kj R ij)p . (A2)(N! 1)[(1" f )" (1" f )]ij kj
Finally, the probability that individual k from group l adopts the cultural variant of individual i from group j is
m (1" f )ct ijPr (kl R ij)p . (A3)(n ! 1)N[(1" f )" (1" f )]d ij kl
By inserting these equations into the transmission function (eq. [9]) expanded as
t p Pr (ij R ij)" Pr (kj R ij)" Pr (kl R ij), (A4)! !!ij
k(i l(j k
we obtain
1 2(1" f ) 1 2(1" f )ij ijt p (1! m ) "m . (A5)! !!ij ct ct[ ] [ ]N! 1 (1" f )" (1" f ) (n ! 1)N (1" f )" (1" f )k(i l(j kij kj d ij kl
Under weak selection, , and using as2(1" f )/[(1" f )" (1" f )] " 1" ( f ! f )/2 [1/(n ! 1)N]! ! f r fij ij kl ij kl d kll(j k
allows us to writen r #d
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(1! m ) 1 mct ctt ! 1" f ! f " ( f ! f ). (A6)"ij ij kj ij( )2 N! 1 2k(i
Noting that
1 Nf fj ijf p ! , (A7)" kjN! 1 N! 1 N! 1k(i
we find after rearrangement that the transmission function is given by
1 Nf fj ijt ! 1" ( f ! f )! (1! m ) ! ! f . (A8)ij ij ct[ ( )]2 N! 1 N! 1
Comparing this equation with equation (13), we see that the increase in local competition is slightly lower under
“pairwise payoff” comparison than under “group payoff” comparison but remains much larger than under genetic
transmission (cf. eqq. [8], [A8]). The factor in front of the square bracket will not affect the direction of1/2
selection, only the speed of evolution, and when group size becomes large ( ), the term in square bracketsN r #
in equation (A8) converges to the second term of equation (13).
Selection Gradient
Darwinian Model
We derive here the gradient of selection on variant A (eq. [14]) when it affects the fitness function w. To that
end, we express equation (6) as
1" f p 1! C p " Bp , (A9)ij ij !ij
where designates the average frequency of variant A in group j but excludingp p [1/(N! 1)]" p!ij kjk(i
individual i from the average. Averaging equation (A9) over all individuals within group j, we have
1
1" f p (1" f ),"j ijN i
p 1" (B! C)p , (A10)j
where is the average frequency of A in group j. Finally, the average of equation (A10) over allp p 1/N" pj iji
groups in the population is
1
1" fp (1" f )," j
n jd
p 1" (B! C)p, (A11)
where p is the average frequency of A in the population and is the number of demes ( due to ourn n r #d d
assumption of the infinite island model of dispersal). Substituting equations (A9)–(A11) into equation (8) yields
to the first-order effect of selection:
2 2w p 1! C p " Bp ! (1! m) (B! C)p ! [1! (1! m) ](B! C)p. (A12)ij ij !ij j
Inserting this fitness function into equation (4) and noting that the covariance of a sum can be decomposed into
a sum of covariances and that the covariance between a constant and a random variable is 0, we obtain
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2 2Dpp !C Cov (p , p )" B Cov (p , p )! (1! m) (B! C) Cov (p , p )! [1! (1! m) ](B! C) Cov (p, p ).ij ij !ij ij j ij ij
(A13)
Because of our assumption of the infinite island model of dispersal, the covariance between theCov (p, p )ij
variant carried by individual i from group j and a homologous variant sampled in one individual chosen at
random from the population is 0. Since is the genetic variance in the population and theCov (p , p )p p(1! p)ij ij
average frequency of variant A in group j can be written as
1 N! 1 1
p p p " p ,!j ij kj( )N N N! 1 k(i
1 N! 1
p p " p , (A14)ij !ij( )N N
we can factor out from equation (A13) and rearrange it to obtainp(1! p)
2 RDpp p(1! p)[!C" BR! (1! m) (B! C)R ], (A15)
where the term in square brackets is the gradient of selection on variant A,
Cov (p , p )!ij ijRp (A16)
p(1! p)
is the regression of the cultural variant at the helping locus of group mates on the variant at the helping locus of
a focal individual (i.e., cultural relatedness), and .RR p [1" (N! 1)R]/N
From the definition of the covariance between two random variables (i.e., )Cov (X, Y )p E[XY ]! E[X]E[Y ]
and from equation (A16), the probability that two homologous cultural variants sampled withoutE[p p ]ij !ij
replacement are both A can be written as
2E[p p ]p Rp" (1! R)p . (A17)ij !ij
This equation suggests that R can also be interpreted as the probability that the lineages of two homologous
variants sampled in two different individuals descend from the same recent common cultural ancestor
(cumulative probability of coalescence in genetics; see Rousset 2002; Roze and Rousset 2003), in which case
both individuals carry allele A with probability p. With complementary probability , the lineages of the two1! R
variants have not coalesced in the recent past (they do not descend from the same recent common ancestor), in
which case the two lineages are considered as independent and the two individuals bear variant A with
probability . This interpretation of the kinship coefficient R in terms of probabilities of identity between2p
variants carried by interacting individuals is valid whenever the kinship associations reach their steady state
before any significant change in allele frequency has occurred at the level of the population, which implies that
selection must be weaker than the other process affecting the dynamics of kinship. This “quasi equilibrium”
assumption is often used in population genetic theory (e.g., Nagylaki 1993; Bu¨rger 2000; Kirkpatrick et al. 2002;
Whitlock 2002; Cherry and Wakeley 2003; Roze and Rousset 2003; Rousset 2006) and allows us to conveniently
evaluate the relatedness in terms of model parameters (see “Cultural Relatedness for the Darwinian Fitness
Model”).
Group Payoff Comparison
We now carry out an analysis similar to that used in “Darwinian Model” in order to derive the selection gradient
on variant A, when it affects the transmission function t (eq. [21]). Substituting equations (A9)–(A11) into
equation (13) gives to the first order effect of selection
t p 1! C p " Bp ! (1! m )(B! C)p ! m (B! C)p. (A18)ij ij !ij ct j ct
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Inserting this equation into equation (5) and using the results of “Darwinian Model,” we obtain under weak
section
Dpp !C Cov (p , p )" B Cov (p , p )! (1! m )(B! C) Cov (p , p ),ij ij !ij ij ct j ij
Rp p(1! p)[!C" BR! (1! m )(B! C)R ]. (A19)ct
Cultural Relatedness for the Darwinian Fitness Model
Here, we present the equilibrium value of the cultural relatedness coefficient R under unbiased horizontal cultural
transmission for the Darwinian fitness model. To that end, we define two parameters: denotes the probabilityas
that two individuals sampled from a group and bearing identical cultural variants before the stage of cultural
transmission (stage 4 of the life cycle) bear an identical cultural variant after cultural transmission, and ad
denotes the probability that two individuals bearing different cultural variants before the stage of cultural
transmission (stage 4 of the life cycle) bear the identical cultural variant after cultural transmission. With these
two parameters, the probability that two individuals sampled in a group after cultural transmission bear the same
cultural variant identical in state is given at steady state by
1 N! 12 2Rp (1! m) a " [Ra " (1! R)a ] " [1! (1! m) ]a , (A20)s s d d{ ( ) }N N
where is the probability that two individuals stem from the same group and is the probability that2(1! m) 1/N
they descend from the same parent. This equation is formally similar to the classical recursions for identity in
state under a model of recurrent mutation (Crow and Aoki 1984), and its solution is
2Na " (1! m) (a ! a )d s dRp . (A21)2N! (1! m) (N! 1)(a ! a )s d
Spread of Group Beneficial Norms
We derive here the gradient of selection on a group beneficial norm (variant A) by assuming exactly the same
payoff structure as the one used by Boyd and Richerson (2002, p. 290). Using our notation, the payoff to
individual i in group j (relative to the payoff of an individual that did not give or receive benefits from the
expression of the social norm) is written as
∗ ˜1" f p 1" sp (p ! p )" Bp , (A22)ij ij j j
where is a public good benefit (shared equally by everybody in the group) resulting from the expression of the˜B
social norm and s is a benefit to individual i in group j expressing the social norm, whenever the average
frequency of the norm in group j exceeds the threshold frequency ; otherwise, it is costly to express the∗p pj
social norm. Averaging the payoff function over all individuals within group j, we have
1
1" f p (1" f ),!j ijN i
∗ ˜p 1" sp (p ! p )" Bp , (A23)j j j
and the average payoff in the whole population is
App. from L. Lehmann et al., “Cultural Transmission of Altruism”
5
1
1! fp (1! f ),!! ij
n N j id
1 ∗ ˜p (1! sp p " sp p ! Bp ), (A24)!! ij j ij j
n N j id
2 ∗ ˜p 1! sE[p ]" spp ! Bp.j
With these payoffs functions, we can evaluate the gradient of selection on the social norm under both genetic
inheritance and cultural inheritance and, when cultural transmission follows the “Darwinian” model, the
“pairwise payoff” and “group payoff” comparison models. We will consider here only the “group payoff”
comparison model because it is qualitative similar but simpler that the “pairwise payoff” comparison model,
which was originally considered by Boyd and Richerson (2002).
Under the “group payoff” comparison model, the transmission function (eq. [13]) for the social norm is
obtained by using the payoff functions (eqq. [A21]–[A23]), which gives to first order
∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗˜ ˜ ˜t p 1! s(p p " p p )! Bp " (1" m )[s(p " p p )! Bp ]" m {s(E[p ]" pp )! Bp}. (A25)ij ij j ij j ct j j j ct j
Substituting equation (A25) into equation (5) and using and , we obtain2Cov (p, p )p 0 Cov (E[p ], p )p 0ij j ij
∗ ˜Dpp s[Cov (p p , p )" p Cov (p , p )]! B Cov (p , p )ij j ij ij ij j ij
2 ∗ ˜" (1" m ){s[Cov (p , p )" p Cov (p , p )]! B Cov (p , p )}. (A26)ct j ij j ij j ij
Since is an indicator variable equal to 1 or 0, we have , so that . Then, from2p p p p E[p p p ]p E[p p ]ij ij ij j ij ij j ij
, we haveCov (X, Y )p E[XY ]" E[X]E[Y ]
Cov (p p , p )p E[p p p ]" E[p p ]E[p ],j ij ij j ij ij j ij ij
p E[p p ](1" p), (A27)j ij
because . The probability that two homologous cultural variants randomly sampled withE[p ]p p E[p p ]ij j ij
replacement from the same group are both A is equal to ( and )2 2 2E[p ] E[p ]p ! p /n E[p p ]p ! p p /(n N)j j j d j ij j ij dj i, j
and can be written in the infinite island model as
2 R R 2E[p ]p R p! (1" R )p . (A28)j
Using this equation, we have
R RCov (p p , p )p [R ! (1" R )p]p(1" p). (A29)j ij ij
The definition of the covariance also gives
2 2 2Cov (p , p )p E[p p ]" E[p ]E[p ], (A30)j ij j ij j ij
where is the probability that three homologous cultural variants randomly sampled with replacement2E[p p ]j ij
from the same group are all of type A ( ). This is2 3E[p p ]p E[p ]j ij j
3 R R 2 R R 3E[p ]p R p! R p ! (1" R " R )p , (A31)j 3 3
where can be interpreted as the probability that the lineages of three homologous variants sampled in threeRR3
different individuals all descend from the same recent cultural ancestor (see Roze and Rousset 2003). Combining
the last two expressions, we obtain
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2Cov (p , p )j ij Rp (1! p)R . (A32)3p(1" p)
Taking into account all terms, the change in frequency of the social norm under weak selection is
R R ∗ R R ∗ R˜Dpp p(1" p){s[R ! (1" R )p" p ]! m BR " (1" m )s[(1! p)R " p R ]}, (A33)ct ct 3
where the gradient of selection is now frequency dependent. In order to obtain an expression for in closedDp
form, it now remains to evaluate the probabilities of identity and . The probability is obtained byR R RR R R3
substituting the solution of equation (25) into equation (15), while the recursion for can be written downRR3
(e.g., Roze and Rousset 2003), but its solution is a bit complicated. In order to get around this problem, we now
assume large group size. In that case, we can neglect because , where is a remainderR R 2 2R R p O(1/N ) O(1/N )3 3
of order , which represents the probability that two individuals have copied a cultural variant from the same21/N
individual and gives the rate at which builds up per generation. To the first order in group size (neglecting allRR3
terms of order and of higher order), the change in variant frequency is given by21/N
R R ∗ ∗ R˜Dpp p(1" p){s[R ! (1" R )p" p ]! [m B! (1" m )sp ]R }. (A34)ct ct
With this assumption of large group size, the social norm can invade the population when rare ( ) if thep r 0
threshold frequency satisfies the inequality∗p
R ˜R (s! m B)ct∗p ! , (A35)R[1" (1" m )R ]sct
where , which is obtained by substituting equation (25) into equation (15) and assumingRR p 1/[Nm (2" m )]ct ct
large group size. If , the inequality simplifies to .∗ R R˜Bp 0 p ! R /[1" (1" m )R ]ct
